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This paper chronicles the often-overlooked relationship between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dr.
James R. Killian, Jr., the first-ever appointed Presidential Science Advisor. Emphasis is placed on the role of
Dr. Killian and the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in advocating curricular reform in the
fields of science and mathematics, a reformation which became doubly important following the successful
launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik I in 1957. This essay examines the efforts of Eisenhower and Killian to
keep pace with the Russian scientific advances by improving American education in the scientific and
technical fields. It concludes with a discussion of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and Killian’s
efforts to see the piece of legislation enacted.
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Several months before his death, Dwight D. Eisenhower was visited in Walter Reed
Hospital by James Rhyne Killian, Jr., the sixty-five-year-old former president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Killian had traveled from Cambridge to Washington,
D.C., on behalf of the trustees of the Atoms for Peace Award. He asked the ailing general “if he
would accept the award. . . . for the great contributions to the peaceful uses of the atom he had
made during his presidency.” Eisenhower gladly accepted the award but insisted that the greater
part of the monetary prize which accompanied it go to the newly-established Eisenhower
College, for he was “anxious to advance the cause of the new college bearing his name.”1 Killian
had served as Eisenhower’s Science Adviser and as chair of the President’s Science Advisory
Committee, a varied group of scientists in whom the president had the highest confidence. In the
fraught atmosphere of the 1957 Sputnik launch, Killian, PSAC, and Eisenhower had formed a
close bond. As such, Eisenhower “welcomed the opportunity to talk” with Killian and “the visit
lasted for nearly an hour. At one point he asked about ‘my scientists,’ and specifically mentioned
several by name.” As the meeting drew to a close and Killian was preparing to make his
departure, Eisenhower said something that Killian would “always cherish: ‘You know, Jim, this
bunch of scientists was one of the few groups that I encountered in Washington who seemed to
be there to help the country and not help themselves.’” In his memoirs, Killian concludes his
account of this emotional final meeting by adding, “His statement was true.”2
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the first of two artificial
satellites. This technological blow to American prestige alarmed American scientists, engineers,
educators, and government officials and set off a series of events which would culminate in the
appointment of Killian, the fifty-two year old president of MIT, to the newly-created office of
1
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Presidential Science Advisor. In an age when science appeared to be the key to winning the Cold
War, Killian would come to play an instrumental role in some of the Eisenhower
administration’s most crucial policy decisions, including the founding of NASA and the
development of the Utility 2 (U2) spy plane.3 But one aspect of Killian’s tenure as Science
Advisor that has been largely overlooked is his relatively modest but certainly noteworthy role in
championing and advocating education reform. Upon assuming the presidency in 1953,
Eisenhower made several public addresses in which he suggested that America’s schools were in
desperate need of attention and reform. Education critics of the period, including Killian, pointed
to America’s manpower shortage in the sciences and engineering professions and suggested
ways to improve science education in the classrooms. The Eisenhower administration’s response
to these concerns was the 1955 White House Conference on Education, a colloquium in which
Killian played a pivotal role.
In the aftermath of Sputnik, education reform in the mathematics and sciences became an
urgent national security issue, leading the United States Congress, originally noncommittal
toward legislating education, to craft an education bill. While Congress debated how to proceed,
Killian gave several public addresses in which he sought to allay the anxieties of the education
critics while advancing his own ideas on education reform. As the summer of 1958 approached,
the House of Representatives and the president seemed stalemated. The Eighty-fifth Congress
and its Democratic majority pushed for measures to increase federal funding of scientific
research. Eisenhower, reluctant to use federal funding to spur the educational renaissance in the
mathematics and sciences, dragged his feet. PSAC in general and Killian in particular would
come to play a peripheral but important role at this stage, reminding Eisenhower that a refusal to
3
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compromise on an education amendment could kill the bill entirely. The president would
eventually sign the bill, known as the National Defense Education Act, in September of 1958.
The act would be one of the administration’s greatest domestic accomplishments, a
“breakthrough in federal funding for education [that] changed the face of the American
educational system.”4 The historian Zuoyue Wang wrote that James R. Killian, Jr. “attempted,
with considerable success, to turn Sputnik into a challenge in science, education, and presidential
science advising.”5 A careful study of the relationship between Killian, PSAC, and Eisenhower,
during the decade of the 1950s, coupled with a discussion of Killian’s role in advising the
administration to actively pursue education reform, reveals that Eisenhower’s first Science
Advisor played a significant role in rejuvenating American education in the fields of science and
mathematics.
Over the years Eisenhower developed a profound personal interest in education and
educational institutions. After returning victoriously from the Second World War, Eisenhower
put the great administrative skill he had developed as a soldier to good use as president of
Columbia University. The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed a precipitous increase in
students enrolling in the public schools.6 In his first State of the Union address on February 2,
1953, Eisenhower stated, “Our school system demands some prompt, effective help. During each
of the last 9 years, more than 1.5 million children have swelled the elementary and secondary
school population of the country.”7 Two months before taking office, Eisenhower alluded to the
importance of education as a means of winning in the Cold War in a statement prepared for the
4
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National Citizens Commission, asserting, “Even in these crisis-days we are vigilant that our
school system continues to improve in physical facilities, in the caliber of its teaching staff, in
education for citizenship.”8
The years between Eisenhower’s first inauguration and the launching of Sputnik in 1957
witnessed a steady stream of criticism directed toward the American educational system.
Between 1954 and 1955, New York Times journalist Benjamin Fine devoted several articles to
the supposed American deficit in science and engineering training. In November of 1954, a
front-page article penned by Fine warned, “While the democracies of the world, including the
United States, are looking the other way, the Soviet Union and its satellites are training scientists
and engineers at an almost feverish pace.” He continued, “The quality of the Soviet technical
schools and colleges is steadily rising.”9 Seven months later, he reiterated in more urgent tones
America’s need to keep pace with the rapidly-advancing Russian education system. He asserted
that in the coming years the Soviet Union would graduate many more engineering and technical
professionals than the United States. In the same article, he asked, “What is the cause of the
engineer shortage [in America]?” He concluded that the nation needed to improve the caliber of
its engineering laboratories and the quality of its equipment, ultimately bettering the working
conditions for scientific and technology students.10 Ruth W. Wolfe, an educator from
Taylorstown, Pennsylvania, published an article in the journal School Science and Mathematics
in which she claimed that Russian engineers were receiving better and more advanced training
than their American counterparts. After blaming the technical manpower shortage on the failure
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of the schools, Wolfe asserted that America was in the midst of “an educational crisis.”11 Killian,
president of MIT, agreed with this sentiment but expressed it in much less alarmist tones. He
stated, “There is shortage enough of the rank and file of competent scientists. . . . but there is a
still greater need for young engineers.” The same article reported that tuition at MIT would rise
to $1,100 in the fall of 1956. At the same time, the university planned to provide greater
scholarship aid to more students in order to boost enrollment.12
Upon assuming office in 1953, Eisenhower began to increasingly entertain the idea of
staging an ambitious colloquium to address the state of American education in general and the
issues of overcrowding and teacher shortage in particular. Known as the White House
Conference on Education, this meeting was planned for the fall of 1955. The criticisms of Fine,
Wolfe, Killian, and other journalists and educators contributed to a renewed discussion of
American curricular reform in the mathematics and sciences among members of the National
Security Council. At the October 13, 1955 meeting of the NSC, many members expressed
concern over the laxity of American education in these fields. Towards the end of the discussion,
Vice President Richard Nixon suggested that the subject be among those discussed at the
upcoming White House Conference on Education.13
The conference drew more than 1,800 citizen delegates from across the entire country to
the nation’s capital on November 28, 1955.14 To a large extent the administration’s goal in
organizing the discussion was to encourage teachers, professors, administrators, and scientists to
share their criticisms, opinions, and solutions to America’s manpower shortage. A series of
11
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subcommittees led by a chairperson was established and each subcommittee was given a
question to discuss, debate, and develop. The goal of each subcommittee was to generate an
answer upon which consensus could be reached. As a member of the Science Advisory
Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, an architect of the Technological Capabilities
Panel, and—more importantly—the president of the most prominent institution of science
learning in the nation, James R. Killian, Jr. was asked by the conference organizers to chair a
subcommittee whose goal was to answer the question, “What should our schools accomplish?”
Thus his role in the conference would be to help determine the direction of American educational
reform. In the months prior to the conference, Killian prepared by seeking the advice of Alan T.
Waterman, director of the National Science Foundation, on issues such as the manpower
shortage and the problems of motivating talented students.15 He also circulated among educators
and scholars a written piece which outlined the competing goals of American public education.16
In the months following the White House Conference on Education, Killian published
two articles in which he reflected upon his chairmanship of this important subcommittee—“The
Shortage Re-examined” and “What Should Our Schools Accomplish?” The first piece was
written fourteen months before Sputnik while the second article was written in the aftermath of
the Soviet satellite’s launch. Killian recalled telling the members of his subcommittee, “We
cannot proceed in any orderly way to build, staff, and finance a school until we agree on the job
we want the school to do.”17 Over the course of the deliberations, Killian asserted, “That we have
an acute shortage of available, effectively used competence in many fields of technology there
can be no reasonable doubt. Neither can there be a reasonable doubt any longer that this scarcity
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is a clear and present danger to the nation and to the entire free world.”18 He advocated numerous
approaches to strengthening the quality of science teaching and to augmenting the number of
American scientists while emphasizing the need to support and advance basic research through
increased funding.19 Killian was in favor of offering more grants and fellowships to professors of
science as well as high school teachers, logically arguing that better teachers would produce
better students. As the deliberations drew to a close, Killian reminded the subcommittee that the
United States needed more teachers in the scientific fields than it did in the humanities, arguing
that an increase in teachers would result in an increase in students pursuing advanced degrees in
scientific fields. He closed by reiterating his main point, “In an age when science is essential to
our safety and our economic welfare, it might be argued that a shortage of science teachers and
of scientists and engineers is a clear and present danger to the nation.”20
Two factions rapidly emerged within the subcommittee, with Killian and science
educators on one side and educators of practically every other subject on the other. Killian and
his minority of scientists and mathematicians lobbied for more exacting science curricula and
argued that “the weakening of standards of intellectual performance” required that more schools
“narrow their aims in order to concentrate on. . . . the education of the young in the basic mental
skills and the knowledge needed in the modern world.” The other position which was adopted by
the majority of educators on the committee emphasized an education more in line with John
Dewey progressivism. They argued that if pupils are not willing or “are not able to apply abstract
ideas,” they should instead, “learn as much as they can about how to live happy and useful
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lives.”21 Instruction in citizenship, ethics, and morality should be emphasized over analytical
thinking, since such instruction was likely to serve the average student better in the long run.
Both sides represented a much different worldview and attitude toward the goals of education.
As the discussions continued, it became increasingly apparent that a compromise was impossible
to achieve.
Faced with majority opposition, Killian and his fellow advocates of education reform in
the mathematics and sciences were forced to concede. The subcommittee thus decided
overwhelmingly in favor of a curriculum designed to address everyday life needs of students; the
scientists and their plans for improved curricula were foiled. As chairman of the subcommittee,
Killian was duty-bound to present Eisenhower with the group’s conclusions, even if he himself
disagreed. Eisenhower had hoped that the conference would advocate at least a basic reformation
of the education system. Such a recommendation from such a varied body may have proved
useful in persuading a hesitant congress to begin discussion of an education reform act.
Waterman lamented the fact that “the place of science in the schools of the nation was discussed
in a peripheral way only”22 while “Killian and the Eisenhower administration must have been
disheartened. . . . by the sentiment expressed at the conference.”23 The White House Conference
on Education revealed that Eisenhower and Killian’s ideas to promote more stringent training in
the mathematics and sciences were not something about which the American public or its
legislators much cared. It would take a sudden and humbling blow to American prestige to
awaken the nation from its delusions of Herculean technological and educational superiority.
Such a jolt would arrive on October 4, 1957.
21
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On the evening of October 4, more than fifty American and Russian scientists were
attending a banquet commemorating the International Geophysical Year at the Soviet embassy in
Washington, DC. At 7:00 P.M., a Moscow radio station proudly announced that the Soviet
Union had launched a 184-pound man-made, spherical satellite into outer space. The American
scientists were stunned, the Russian scientists elated. The successful launch of this satellite,
named Sputnik, represented a major Soviet victory in the space race.24 Eisenhower viewed
Sputnik as more of a blow to American public morale than an irreversible defeat of American
science. In a post-Sputnik letter to his brother Arthur, he wrote, “This past year—actually the
period since the beginning of the Suez crisis last July—has been one of steadily mounting crises
and pressures, culminating in the Little Rock situation at home and the blows to our prestige by
that and by the Russian scientific achievements in the past few weeks.”25 Indeed, the greatest and
deepest consequence of Sputnik was that America’s confidence in its scientific, technological,
and educational superiority had been shaken.
As an acting member of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense
Mobilization (ODM-SAC) and as president of the nation’s leading institute of technology,
Killian was well-positioned to comment on the event. In his memoir, he reflected, “Like
everyone else, I was stirred by the orbiting of Sputnik I. That a satellite had gone into orbit really
did not surprise me, for I knew that the United States and the Soviet Union planned to launch
satellites for scientific purposes as part of their participation in the IGY, the International
Geophysical year. . . . Nevertheless, the news of Sputnik found me—and most of the nation—

24

Robert A. Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993), xiii.
“D.D. Eisenhower to Arthur Bradford Eisenhower, November 8, 1957,” in Louis Galambos and Daun
Van Ee, eds, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vol. 18 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001), 551.
25

psychologically vulnerable and technically surprised.”26 He added, “That others possessed their
share of technology I was certainly aware, but somehow I pictured them all laboring far behind
this country. . . . Now this faith was shaken by Sputnik.”27
Hans A. Bethe, a German-American physicist and a member of ODM-SAC, recalled that
Eisenhower’s response to the news of Sputnik was to call together his science advisors. Within a
fortnight, the committee was assembled before the president to offer views of the situation. Bethe
noted, “Sputnik was a really dramatic effect on the committee. In fact, this was because of
President Eisenhower. It was a dramatic effect on him. He remembered that he had a Science
Advisory Committee. He called us in for a session almost immediately.”28At the ODM-SAC
meeting with the president on October 15, 1957, Isidor Isaac Rabi, one of the nation’s premier
physicists and the chairman of the committee, advised Eisenhower to appoint a permanent fulltime science advisor who could assist the president in making decisions involving technology
and advise him on public policy matters in which science played a role. Rabi emphasized that the
appointed advisor should be a person with whom the president “could live with easily.” Killian
agreed with Rabi and pointed out that a committee should also be established to assist this new
advisor.29 The day after the committee met, Republican Senator Charles E. Potter of Michigan
wrote a letter to the president in which he asked, “What steps should be taken to stimulate
development of scientific talent? Should we re-cast our entire educational system, gearing its
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emphasis to new scientific vistas?”30 Five days later, Eisenhower sent a letter to Potter in
response to the senator’s query. He told Potter:
I have asked the Science Advisory Committee to give me their views—not only in the
field of outer space to which your letter refers, but in the fields of nuclear energy and
radioisotopes, of the care of health and the cure of disease, the teaching of science, the
awakening of more widespread scientific interest in our people, and so forth. The Science
Advisory Committee agreed forthwith to consider the dimensions of the problem to be
studied and soon to provide me with their outline. . . . Incidentally, it may interest you to
know that in the conversation referred to above, my scientific friends identified as
probably the most serious and difficult phase of our situation, not the proved current
competence and advances of Soviet scientists, but rather the difficulties we in the United
States face in strengthening, over the coming years, our personnel trained in science and
attracting to this pursuit of science an increasing number of individuals of quality and
promise. To this part of the problem, also mentioned in your letter, they feel we should
devote efforts calculated to enlist nation-wide support. One expressed it, ‘I’m not
frightened concerning the present, for we have the capacity to destroy any nation on
earth; but I am frightened as to the prospect we would face ten years hence if present
trends continue.’ We must start recruiting and educating scientists now.31
A few days after Eisenhower’s meeting with ODM-SAC, White House Chief of Staff
Sherman Adams called the MIT president’s office in Cambridge. He told Killian that the
president had been entertaining the idea of appointing a full-time Presidential Science Advisor
and wanted Killian to come to Washington to discuss what the duties of this new position should
be. Killian reflected that Adams “didn’t say that I was being considered for the post, but I knew
what he meant.”32 On October the twenty-fourth, exactly twenty days after the news of Sputnik’s
launch reached Eisenhower, Killian met with the president over breakfast and was offered the
position of Science Advisor. He informed the president that he would gladly accept the post and
returned to MIT to get his affairs in order and to request a leave of absence.
30
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News of Russia’s most recent technological triumph created a climate of fear and anxiety
throughout the United States which bordered on hysteria. Killian reflected that his appointment
to the office of Science Advisor “came as a result of the successful launching of Sputnik I by the
Russians. The Soviet achievement created a climate of near hysteria in the United States with
many people jumping to the conclusion that the Soviets had surpassed the United States.”33 In his
memoir Waging Peace, Eisenhower called this period “one of anxiety” and stated “Sputnik had
revealed the psychological vulnerability of our people.”34 Scientists, politicians, and educators
began to publish articles and give public addresses in which they decried the American deficit in
education. These criticisms focused upon the difference between the American and Soviet
education systems, contrasting the stringent Russian science curriculums with the much more
relaxed American curriculum. They asserted that Russian students were far ahead of their
American counterparts in developing analytical and technological skills. Killian observed:
From that point the line of reasoning was simple and direct; it was education that had
made the scientists; it was American education, therefore, that was at fault. A storm of
criticism directed toward American education blew up with astonishing rapidity. Little of
this criticism was well informed and thoughtful; nonetheless it struck close to home.
After all I was president of a major educational institution devoted primarily to science
and technology; and if there was indeed any serious breakdown in the American
educational system, I was among those to blame.35
Indeed, little of the criticism which surfaced in October of 1957 and the immediate
aftermath of Sputnik was “well informed and thoughtful.” To the contrary, it was alarmist. Some
of the most outspoken critics of American education were Admiral Hyman G. Rickover and Roy
D. Welch, Jr. Rickover was a four-star admiral and chief of the Atomic Energy Committee’s
Naval Reactors branch while Welch was a science textbook author and publisher for Rand
33
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McNally & Co. Rickover made the alarmist claim that the domestic “shortage of scientists is
more dangerous to the United States than the Red Army’s 300 odd divisions—its recent stock
pile of A bombs and H bombs.”36 Welch followed up the admiral’s comments by asserting that a
shortage of teachers and a decrease in the quality of the public school system was to blame: “The
problem is aggravated by not enough college graduates entering teaching even to replace
departing teachers. Furthermore, the output of new high school teachers in important subject
areas has declined sharply in 5 years. The decline in the science field excels all of the other
fields.” He concluded, “Critical shortage of high school science and mathematics teachers. . . .
causes erosion of quality in our schools.”37
In the fall of 1957, the popular magazine U.S. News & World Report published an article
entitled “The 3 R’s in Russia are Really Tough.” Published on the very same day that Killian
officially assumed the post of Science Advisor, this article was among the first to address and to
report the ostensible realities of the Soviet education in the aftermath of Sputnik. The title
referred to the “3 R’s,” the common abbreviation for the basics elements of the elementary
school education—reading, ’riting (writing), and ’rithmetic (arithmetic). The piece presented the
facts in a scholarly fashion, not alarmist but rather straightforward in its conclusions. It stated
that Russian students tended to receive more hours of instruction in the mathematics and sciences
during their 10-year secondary school career than American students received in their 12-year
education program. Most importantly, it noted, “All Russian students graduating from the tenth
grade in 1955 had completed five years of physics, four years of chemistry, six years of foreign
language, and five years of mathematics above the level of arithmetic.”38 It was a system that
turned out “nearly 225,000 physicists, engineers, and other professionals each year,” the system
36
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which “produced the scientists and engineers who built and launched Sputnik.”39
One week prior to the publication of the U.S. News & World Report article, on November
7, 1957, President Eisenhower gave a national radio and television address to the American
people. The purpose of the speech was to reaffirm America’s commitment to both scientific
advancement and to re-establishing its technical superiority. The appointment of James R.
Killian, Jr., to the recently-created office of Presidential Science Advisor was intended to be an
important first step toward this goal. Eisenhower stated that ODM-SAC, his “scientific friends,”
had informed him in the post-Sputnik meeting that “one of our greatest, and most glaring,
deficiencies is the failure of us in this country to give high enough priority to scientific education
and the place of science in our national life.”
To correct these deficiencies, Eisenhower stated that he intended to ensure, “the very best
thought and advice that the scientific community can supply, heretofore provided to me on an
informal basis, is now fully organized and formalized so that no gap can occur. The purpose is to
make it possible for me, personally, whenever there appears to be any unnecessary delay in our
development system, to act promptly and decisively. To that end, I have created the office of
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. This man, who will be aided by a
staff of scientists and a strong Advisory Group of outstanding experts reporting to him and to
me, will have the active responsibility of helping me follow through on the program that I am
partially outlining tonight and next week.”40 The Science Advisory Committee of the Office of
Defense Mobilization, a temporary and informal body, would thus be elevated to a permanent
39
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body and renamed the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC).
The next step was to formally announce the name of the man who would chair this
committee. Eisenhower declared, “I am glad to be able to tell you that this position has been
accepted by Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is a
man who enjoys my confidence, and the confidence of his colleagues in the scientific and
engineering world, and in the government. . . . Dr. Killian will see to it that those projects which
experts judge have the highest potential shall advance with the utmost possible speed.” At the
end of the address, he concluded, “there is much more to science than its function in
strengthening our defense.”41 Indeed, science had another essential role to play in domestic
affairs aside from defense and military technology—education. Education reform would prove to
be one of the projects which Killian and PSAC “advanced with the utmost possible speed.” The
appointment of the president of one of the nation’s most preeminent educational institutions was
partially intended to mollify the alarmists and the critics of the American education system. It
was also a symbolic gesture on the part of the Eisenhower administration which established and
affirmed the role of science and scientists in the White House decision-making process.
As promised in the November 7 address, Eisenhower went on the air again a week later
to further outline his scientific and educational goals. He had been invited to speak at
Oklahoma’s semi centennial celebration on November 13th and saw the commemoration as the
appropriate venue to deliver a second speech advocating education reform and a renewed
commitment to scientific progress. In a personal letter to California businessman John A.
McCone, Eisenhower explained that he intended the November 13 speech to “present (at least as
it stands at the present moment) some of the stark realities of the rate at which we are training
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scientists vis-a-vis the Russians.”42 In this nationally-broadcast speech, he did just that. Calmly,
he admitted to the American audience, “The Soviet Union now has—in the combined category
of scientists and engineers—a greater number than the United States. And it is producing
graduates in these fields at a much faster rate. Recent studies of the educational standards of the
Soviet Union show that this gain in quantity can no longer be considered offset by lack of
quality. This trend is disturbing. Indeed, according to my scientific advisers, this is for the
American people the most critical problem of all.” Years earlier, Killian had warned of a
technical manpower shortage. Eisenhower would conclude the November 13 address in
Oklahoma by asserting that this shortage was a reality and a top concern for the administration.
“My scientific advisers place this problem above all other immediate tasks of producing missiles,
of developing new techniques in the Armed Services. We need scientists in the ten years ahead.
They say we need them by thousands more than we are now presently planning to have.”43 The
president’s proclamation that education was and would continue to be a chief concern of PSAC,
Killian, and the administration set the stage for curricular reform and further federal aid to
educational institutions.
At this point, a discussion of PSAC’s purpose and the role that the body was expected to
play in the administration’s decision-making process is appropriate. First and foremost, the job
of the President’s Science Advisory Committee was simply that—to advise. Eisenhower asked
Killian to “make [himself] available as an advisor on scientific and technological matters to those
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officers of government holding policy responsibilities.”44 PSAC had no budget, no operating
responsibilities, and no role in implementing policy. Eisenhower had made it quite clear in his
November 7 address that the committee’s primary function was to make the scientific
community’s knowledge and expertise available to the president at all times. Unlike ODM-SAC,
this new and improved advisory body was a permanent standing committee within the White
House that reported directly to the Chief Executive. In an age when technological terrors such as
thermonuclear war, improved missiles, and orbiting satellites threatened to annihilate entire
civilizations, having a group of physicists, engineers, chemists, and biophysicists on hand to
offer well informed advice made a good deal of strategic sense. The point to emphasize is that
this committee was composed of scientists, not politicians, whose charge it was to advise the
president and to offer solutions to contemporary problems. PSAC had virtually unfettered access
to Eisenhower and his chief aides at all times and held the president’s ear and confidence,
making it, in effect, the nation’s most powerful scientific think tank. But how and why did
Eisenhower place so much faith and confidence in his science advisors, especially Killian? Why,
for that matter, did he choose Killian to assume this post over a number of potentially more
qualified candidates? Both questions deserve to be explored before an investigation of PSAC’s
role in education reform can commence.
To return to the previous question, why was Killian, a college president, chosen to chair
PSAC over prominent scientists such as Edward Teller, “the father of the hydrogen bomb,” or
Werner von Braun, arguably the world’s leading rocket scientist? Zuoyue Wang asserted that the
selection of Killian indicated Eisenhower and his chief advisors’ belief that Sputnik “represented
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less a military and technological threat than one in science and education.”45 Killian had served
as an acting member of ODM-SAC, played a crucial role as subcommittee chairman during the
1955 White House Conference on Education, and presided over MIT for nine years. Most
importantly, he was so politically moderate that he was essentially apolitical.46 Interestingly, he
was also the only member of PSAC who did not have an advanced degree in a scientific field or
any scientific research background. Killian had received his degree in engineering administration
from MIT in 1926 and had proceeded up the “winding stair to the MIT presidency.”47 Wang
describes Killian as “quiet” and “stately” and notes that he had the “reputation of a brilliant
science administrator.”48 He speculates that “he knew both the scientific community and the
government well enough to be an effective liaison between them. Conceivably, his nonscientist
background might actually have made other White House staff feel more comfortable in working
with him.”49 The American political journalist Theodore H. White described the MIT president
as both “a genial South Carolinian” and “a brisk, incisive man with the manner and dispatch of a
brilliant surgeon.”50
In short, James R. Killian, Jr. was viewed by the administration and the public as a
brilliant man with “a wealth of administrative and technological experience. . . . a methodical
planner, but also as one who will slash through red tape to handle an emergency when the
occasion demands.”51 A newspaper article entitled “Scientists Cheer Choice of Killian,” released
the day after the president’s announcement, reported that the scientific community viewed the
45
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MIT president as “a man of sufficient stature to command the respect of the President, the
Cabinet and Congress. It was hoped that he could convince Washington that the burning issue of
the day was the country’s intellectual competition with the Soviet Union.”52 A later article
reviewed the symbolic effect of the Killian appointment, concluding that he and his team
represented “the nation’s scientific and technological effort to stay ahead of the Soviet Union.”53
On November 15, 1957, James R. Killian, Jr. was sworn in, signaling the arrival of science
advice to executive decision-making. His duties began immediately. Within his first week in
office, the first Presidential Science Advisor was bombarded by more than 5,000 letters
containing suggestions on how to proceed in reassuring and reestablishing American scientific
and technological superiority.54
Now that the post of Science Advisor had been filled, the next order of business was
creating the committee over which the advisor would preside. This proved relatively simple.
Most of the members of PSAC were acting members of ODM-SAC, a committee which had
been established in 1951 during the Korean War. Roughly one-half of PSAC’s members came
from educational institutions—Killian, Robert Bacher, Hans A. Bethe, Detlev W. Bronk, George
Kistiakowsky, Edward Purcell, Isidor Isaac Rabi, Howard P. Robertson, Jerome Wiesner, and
Jerrold R. Zacharias. The other half were established researchers at scientific institutions. In
addition, the majority of these individuals were politically inactive and moderate in their political
sympathies. Hans Bethe later recalled, “As I remember it there was really a great deal of
consensus within the committee. Surprisingly much.”55 PSAC was therefore largely united in its
opinions, views, and goals. Since the membership of the body was largely composed of
52
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educators, scholars, and academics, one of the subjects upon which the committee agreed was
the need for curricular reform and increased funding for academic institutions.
Having discussed the political and physical make-up of PSAC, the topic of Eisenhower’s
relationship with his science advisors must be explored. First, Eisenhower had an analytical mind
and likely developed a deep respect for analytical, scientific minds during his career as a military
officer.56 He later reminisced that “some of his happiest times in the White House were those
spent with PSAC.”57 White House Staff Secretary Andrew J. Goodpaster later noted, “The
President said that he had a deep sense of obligation to this group” and went on to recall that
Eisenhower “tended to put science advice into more and more subjects of national policy.”58
Why did Eisenhower turn to his science advisors for suggestions in “more and more subjects of
national policy?” In his memoir Waging Peace, the president described Killian and the
committee in glowing terms. He reflected that the appointment of Dr. Killian, whom he
affectionately called “my wizard,” “worked out wonderfully” and that the MIT president “helped
to make certain that the government was supporting both basic and applied research. Without
such distinguished help, any President in our time would be, to a certain extent, disabled.”59
The middle of the way political viewpoint held by many of PSAC’s members is another
reason why Eisenhower sought the committee’s advice in a wide array of subjects. He believed
them to be objective and reliable advisors and, indeed, they were. Killian reminisced that
Eisenhower “came to have a feeling that these advisers, by virtue of being scientists, were
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endowed with an objectivity in technical matters that he didn’t find in other advisors.”60 He
noted, “The effectiveness and influence of PSAC had resulted from its capacity to be objective
and thorough. Repeatedly its recommendations prevailed, because its panels had done their
homework thoroughly and their conclusions were not tainted with the influence of vested
interests.”61 Eisenhower was therefore drawn to this advisory body for both personal and
political reasons. Unsurprisingly, one of the arenas in which Eisenhower turned to his scientists
for advice was education reform in the mathematics and sciences.
Hans Bethe once claimed that Eisenhower had the highest confidence in Killian.62 On
December 7, 1957, one month into his duties as Presidential Science Advisor, Killian received a
letter from Eisenhower in which the Chief Executive conveyed his confidence, outlined what he
expected from his science advisor, and confirmed the level of security clearance granted to the
advisor. The president emphasized that Killian’s role would be “to anticipate future trends or
developments in the area of science and technology, particularly as they affect national security,
and to suggest future actions in regard thereto.” To accomplish these ends, Eisenhower
authorized him “to be in attendance at meetings of the National Security Council, the Cabinet
and the Operations Coordinating Board” and to “have full access to all plans, programs, and
activities involving science and technology in the Government, including the Department of
Defense, AEC, and the CIA.”63 Killian provides a full transcription of this letter in his memoirs
and records the significance of its contents: “The authorization in this letter to attend National
Security Council meetings and other classified meetings and to be present at cabinet meetings
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was very important, because it opened to me the sessions of the highest policy-making bodies of
the government.”64 Indeed, the Presidential Science Advisor had been given almost carte
blanche. The virtually unfettered access to bodies such as the CIA, NSC, and the cabinet which
Killian was given was politically and symbolically significant. Although such license was not of
great consequence in molding Killian’s and PSAC’s views toward education reform, the high
level of access to top-secret and confidential information granted to the science advisor
reinforces the claim that Eisenhower placed enormous trust and confidence in his scientists. In
addition, the letter reflects and symbolizes the movement of science advice into most levels and
sub fields of government.
Sputnik had left in its wake a tense and paranoid national atmosphere. One of Killian’s
first and primary duties upon assuming office was to reassure the nation. He noted that, in his
public addresses, he “sought to temper the hysterical response to Sputnik, to reassure all and
sundry that we had not suffered ‘another Pearl Harbor,’ and to describe the assignment the
president was giving to PSAC and me.”65 His first public speech was in January of 1958, at the
annual dinner of the Women’s National Press Club. He was the keynote speaker. In attendance
were Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, and the
minority leaders of the House and Senate, Congressman Joseph W. Martin and Senator William
Knowland, respectively.66 In this address, Killian reaffirmed that the United States had not fallen
behind the Soviet Union. “The problem facing the country,” he said, “is not America’s
leadership and technological strength as of today, but the maintenance of its leadership
tomorrow.” He continued by stating that the launching of Sputnik “has given many people the
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idea that the Russians suddenly have complete technological superiority over us. This impression
is wrong. . . . Sputnik has shown that the USSR is a very serious competitor in the technological
field. She has not passed us yet, but she has a strong will to do so.”67
Towards the end of the speech and in the presence of the most powerful and influential
congressmen in America, the Science Advisor reasserted the need for education reform.
Regarding science education, he stated, “Up until now, we have done little—save in our best
schools where science is probably taught as well as anywhere in the world. We have been
blocked by the argument that if we strengthen our science education we might run the risk of
weakening something else. It is not that scientists should be educated at the expense of people
who might be going into the humanities. Rather, it is that science courses have come to be taught
more poorly in many schools than the humanities and need to be brought up to par.”68 In this
speech, Killian reaffirmed the message that he had conveyed to his subcommittee a little over
two years before at the White House Conference on Education. It was important to teach
citizenship, social studies, and the humanities, but analytical subjects such as mathematics and
science needed to receive an equal amount of educational emphasis. The primary theme of
Killian’s premier address, however, was not curricular reform. The principal purpose of this
speaking engagement was to reassure and reaffirm to the American people and their elected
officials that Sputnik had not marked the demise of U.S. technological and scientific prestige.
Eisenhower later confided to the MIT president in a personal letter, “When millions, startled by
sputniks, wanted to plunge headfirst and almost blindly into the space age, you assumed the
complex responsibilities of trying to coordinate, for me. . . . programs [which] were not dictated
or designed in an atmosphere of panic. No one did more than you, in those early days, to bring
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reason, fact and logic into our plans for space research and adventure.”69
Killian’s keynote address at the annual dinner of the Women’s National Press Club was
the first of several speeches that he made during his tenure as Science Advisor. Many of these
addresses were subsequently published in both popular magazines and academic journals. In
addition, the newspapers of the time highlighted the key themes expressed in these public
speaking engagements. Following the speech to the Women’s National Press Club, the focus of
Killian’s addresses shifted from emphasizing America’s technological prowess to asserting the
need for educational reform. In a speech given on March 3, 1958, at the annual awards banquet
of the Seventeenth Annual Science Talent Search in Washington, D.C., the Science Advisor
alluded to the oppressive Soviet system in encouraging the aspiring scientists to “mix with [their]
professional work some of the ingredient for making gentle the life of our turbulent times, for
cultivating civility in a period of harsh and brutal incivilities.”70
Twenty days later, Killian appeared onstage alongside Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, one
of the nation’s most outspoken critics of American education, and Dr. Merle Tuve, Director of
Terrestrial Magnetism Research at the Carnegie Institution. The occasion was the fiftieth
anniversary celebration of the Saint Alban’s School for Boys in Washington, D.C. The audience
was composed primarily of high school principals and science and mathematics teachers from
Washington, D.C. and the surrounding area. “The purpose of the meeting was to respond to
President Eisenhower’s challenge, made last November in Oklahoma City, that all school boards
and parent-teacher’s organizations scrutinize their curricula and standards to see whether they
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met the demands of the time.”71 The three men addressed the audience in succession, proposing
and promoting ideas to increase the quality of American education in the mathematics and
sciences.
Among the proposals made were the following: “Reward superior teachers with
significantly larger salaries,” “Give the high school teacher enough free time to become a scholar
again,” and “Push the talented student ahead as fast as he can go, rather than holding him back
with the dolts.”72 The trio agreed that both gifted students and teachers needed to be rewarded
and that the school system should require that, “higher standards, including increased emphasis
on science, must be imposed upon high school students.” Killian asserted, “Our overriding
objective today. . . . must be to elevate standards of performance and enlarge the intellectual
content of the secondary school program.” Tuve argued, “The key to this whole program of more
high quality students is more high quality teachers.” Summoning his usual flair for the dramatic,
Rickover called for a more rigorous standard of academic excellence, proclaiming, “We shall
have to make a choice: educate our children better or downgrade our standard of living.”73 Since
the Science Advisor was an active member of the administration, Eisenhower followed the
reports of Killian’s public appearances. He also went to PSAC meetings regularly for
consultation and met with Killian individually on a regular basis.74 It has been established that
the president had great faith in his Science Advisor and that the two former college presidents
saw eye to eye in most matters of domestic and science policy. One of the many subjects on
which they strongly agreed was the pressing need for education reform in the mathematics and
sciences.
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Roughly one month before Killian spoke at the awards banquet of the Seventeenth
Annual Science Talent Search, Eisenhower began drafting a document which he intended to have
circulated amongst the nation’s legislators during the second session of the eighty-fifth congress.
This manifesto was officially titled “Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting Recommendations Relative to Our Educational System.” It was referred to the
House Committee on Education and Labor in late January and ordered to be printed.75
Eisenhower opened the communiqué by reaffirming a message which he had been stating both
privately and publicly for years—that the majority of the responsibility for improving individual
schools should fall to the individual states.76 He wrote, “For the increased support our
educational system now requires, we must look primarily to citizens and parents acting in their
own communities, school boards and city councils, teachers, principals, school superintendents,
state boards of education and state legislatures, trustees and faculties of private institutions.”
However, Eisenhower realized that the urgency of the situation necessitated a certain degree of
involvement on the part of the federal government. “Because of the national security interest in
the quality and scope of our educational system in the years immediately ahead, however, the
Federal Government must also undertake to play an emergency role.”77
He then went on to echo the claim which Killian had been making for the better part of a
decade, stating, “But if we are to maintain our position of leadership, we must see to it that
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today’s young people are prepared to contribute the maximum to our future progress. Because of
the growing importance of science and technology, we must necessarily give special, but by no
means exclusive, attention to education in science and engineering.” He went on to praise the
efforts of the National Science Foundation and its educational programs but insisted that much
more could be done to foster science education and counter the technical manpower shortage.78
Eisenhower went on to recommend a fivefold increase in government appropriations for
the National Science Foundation, emphasizing that the revitalization of science education should
be a top concern of the organization. First, he recommended increased funding in support of
institutions “for the supplementary training of science and mathematics teachers and a somewhat
larger increase to support teacher fellowships. This will provide additional study opportunities to
enable more science and mathematics teachers in our schools and colleges to improve their
fundamental knowledge and, through improved teaching techniques, stimulate the interest and
imagination of more students in these important subjects.” Second, the president pointed out that
many schools’ classroom materials are “out of date or poorly conceived” and advocated an
increase in funds to “stimulate the improvement of the content of science courses at all levels of
our educational system.”79 A third increase targeted NSF programs which aroused, nurtured, and
encouraged young minds to pursue scientific fields as a career. Eisenhower noted that, “The
Foundation has already developed a series of programs directly focused on the problem of
interesting individual students in science careers, and these programs should be expanded.”
Towards the end of this manifesto, Eisenhower noted that the planning and implementation of
educational reform in the sciences would be the responsibility of scientists; general education
reform in the humanities, social sciences, and languages would fall within the purview of the
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Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.80
In this message to Congress, Dwight D. Eisenhower reaffirmed his commitment to
education reform and reiterated his belief that much of the financial responsibility for this reform
would fall to the individual schools boards within the individual states. He also confirmed the
place of scientists in planning, encouraging, and promoting a reformation in science education.
He closed the message by returning to his original point—that education reform was a national
security issue that demanded immediate congressional action. “National security requires that
prompt action be taken to improve and expand the teaching of science and mathematics. . . . The
administration therefore recommends that the Congress authorize Federal grants to the States, on
a matching basis, for this purpose. These funds would be used, in the discretion of the States and
the local school systems, either to help employ additional qualified science and mathematics
teachers, to help purchase laboratory equipment and other materials, to supplement salaries of
qualified science and mathematics teachers, or for other related programs.”81 In a way,
Eisenhower used the confusion and hysteria that accompanied the successful launch of the Soviet
satellite Sputnik to his advantage. Many American educators had been hesitant to promote
curricular reform in the mathematics and sciences during the White House Conference on
Education in 1955. Between 1955 and October 4, 1957, the Congress had been equally hesitant
to encourage a bill to promote education reform in these fields. Sputnik allowed Eisenhower to
frame the issue of education reform as a national security matter, prodding Congress to revisit
and reconsider legislation geared toward maintaining America’s scientific preeminence.
In the coming months, the president and his scientists would face a daunting task.
Maneuvering the education bill for which Eisenhower had called through a skeptical Congress
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held by the Democratic Party would prove no easy task. The Chief Executive’s hesitance to
provide any more than the limited government funding already proposed to academic institutions
within the individual states would also complicate matters greatly. Following the launch of
Sputnik, Congress warmed to the idea of a bill to substantially aid education but felt that the
federal government and its coffers could and should play a more active role. The legislative
branch’s greatest point of departure from the president’s plan was its desire for a bill that would
provide more federal grants for research. Drafting a bill upon which all parties would agree took
considerable amounts of complex negotiations, a process in which James R. Killian, Jr., as
Science Advisor, played a small but crucial role.82 Killian recounted in his memoirs, “This
relationship of confidence was a crucial factor in enhancing the influence of the committee and
in gaining presidential support for its recommendations. It also resulted in Eisenhower’s turning
to his science advisers for advice on defense budget issues and on such diverse matters as the
Defense Education Act.”83 Killian also elaborated on PSAC’s modest but central advisory role
during the negotiations surrounding the passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958.
He wrote:
The president had consulted many people. . . . including his science advisors. Marion B.
Folsom, secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, along with his
deputy, Elliot Richardson, played key roles in developing an administration program for
education, and both Folsom and the president invited me to share in the discussions
leading to the development of the administration’s proposals. . . . On several occasions
the president invited me to join with his brother, Milton Eisenhower, then president of
Johns Hopkins University, in meeting with him informally in the mansion to discuss the
various educational proposals that were put before the president.84
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The House Education and Labor Committee eventually drafted a bill co-authored by
Representative Carl Elliot and Senator J. Lister Hill, both Democrats from Alabama. The
document included a $10,000,000-plus increase in government funding for area vocational
programs and research. It also included an item by which the federal government provided lowinterest loans for college or graduate school students. Eisenhower communicated to the
congressional committee that he would not support a bill that featured this $10,000,000 increase;
in regards to a federal loan title, he remained noncommittal. The committee granted the
administration this concession and dropped the $10,000,000 item completely.85 Even after the
vocational-education program had been erased from the final draft, Eisenhower remained
reluctant to support the piece of legislation. He hesitated to endorse the loan title, believing the
item to be another example of the federal government overstepping its bounds. He reflected, “I
met with Secretary Folsom, Dr. Killian, and other advisors to consider strategy. I insisted that we
stick to the main points of the administration bill, resisting in particular an increase in
scholarships above ten thousand.”86
White House aide Reginald Conley attended the executive sessions of the Committee of
Education and Labor and confided to Elliot Richardson that the passage of the bill depended on
Eisenhower’s backing. He asserted, “In its present form the Committee Bill is so close to the
Administration’s proposal, except for inclusion of the loan title, that I don’t see how the
Administration could make any serious objection to it. However, its chances of passage are, in
my view, practically non-existent short of vigorous, all-out, whole-hearted support from the
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Administration.”87 Folsom and Killian would prove instrumental in securing the Chief
Executive’s support for a loan title.
Killian described the small but critical role he played in convincing Eisenhower and
members of Congress to support the draft of the National Defense Education Act produced by
the House Committee on Education and Labor:
One of the most controversial parts of the education message was the proposal for federal
scholarships. A number of thoughtful members of Congress who were otherwise very
much in support of the overall concept of the bill were dubious about federal
scholarships, except at the graduate level. I remember attending some informal meetings
of members of Congress, particularly at the invitation of Congressman [Peter]
Frelinghuysen of New Jersey. In these meetings a proposal was generated to substitute
federal loans for the proposed scholarships, and Congressman [Walter] Judd introduced
an amendment to the bill providing for federal loans. Eisenhower at first was skeptical
about loans. He recalled that Columbia University Medical School’s loan fund had not
been called upon very much by students, and he doubted whether young people and their
parents would be willing to go into debt for their education. Secretary Folsom asked me
to join him in discussing this amendment with the president, and at this meeting I was
able to give Eisenhower a report on the great success of a loan fund started in 1930 at
MIT and to express my conviction that a loan fund designed as a student aid fund and not
as a commercial loan arrangement would be attractive to students. In the end, Eisenhower
agreed to accept the Judd amendment and to give it his blessing.88
Killian described MIT’s loan fund to Eisenhower “not as a financial operation, but as a
real student aid program in which the interest rate was subordinated. A low interest rate was set,
and it was used right up to the hilt by students, and in fact the payoffs were better than we ever
forecasted. This was a factor in persuading Eisenhower to support a loan program.”89
Eisenhower realized that a bill which provided for federal loans was better than no education bill
at all. He later recalled that Judd’s provision making federal loans available at 3% was “a good
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one” which “provided for repayment of each loan by the recipient within ten years of his leaving
school. In essence its purpose was to make an education available to the able student while
encouraging self-reliance.”90
Killian had traveled back and forth between the White House, Congress, and the
Department of HEW, attending meetings and providing advice on issues related to science
education. The most important piece of advice he offered was to the President of the United
States. As a college president and, more importantly, as the president of the nation’s premier
institution of science education in the country, his contribution to the discussion played an
instrumental role in persuading Eisenhower to support a loan measure. According to the Science
Advisor, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology had benefited from similar programs. As
such, providing federal loans to stimulate higher science education was a pivotal first step to
countering America’s technical manpower shortage. In his memoirs, Killian plainly states that he
had played “a modest part in shaping ideas and strategy in behalf of the National Defense
Education Act.”91 This is a fair comment which brilliantly and accurately conveys to the
historian the nature of the Science Advisor’s role in the Eisenhower administration—to advise.
Killian had a say in the decision-making process but hardly any say in the implementation
process. After the president communicated to Congress his desire to approve the Judd
amendment and the legislative act as it stood, events were quickly set into motion.
On July 3, 1958, House minority leader Joseph Martin predicted that this act to increase
government aid to scientific institutions would be passed before the end of the congressional
session. He was correct. In a 23 to 3 vote, the House Education and Labor Committee, after
consulting with “Republican committee members, the Secretary of Health, Education, and
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Welfare, and the science adviser to the President” hinted to reporters that the bill, as it stood,
would likely be passed by the Legislative Branch and signed into law by the president.
Newspapers of the time reported to the American public the short-term and long-term effects that
the National Defense Education Act promised to produce. The New York Times reported, “Fiscal
experts at the Health, Education, and Welfare Department figured that the four-year House
measure to aid science education would cost $826,584,000 as finally approved. Its provisions
include from 19,000 to 23,000 Federal scholarships for talented students, a student loan program,
and a series of provisions to strengthen the teaching of mathematics, the sciences, and foreign
languages.”92 The student loan program authorized the federal government to pay $47.5 million
for fiscal 1959, $75 million for fiscal 1960, $82.5 million for fiscal 1961, and $90 million for
fiscal 1962.93
It should be noted that Killian and PSAC’s desire for a loan title was not driven purely by
a selfless faith in science education’s ability to win the Cold War; institutional and economic
considerations also likely played a significant role. The National Defense Education Act called
for increased federal funding for education in general and science education in particular. As
such, the scientific educational institutions at which half of the PSAC committee members were
employed would be among the largest beneficiaries. In the fall of 1956, while Killian was still
president of MIT, tuition at the institution rose by more than 20%, from $900 $1,100.94 The
federal loans for which Killian and PSAC lobbied would encourage more students to pursue a
degree at academic institutions by offsetting some of these costs.
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The National Defense Education Act was enacted on September 2, 1958. Responsibility
for implementing the provisions of the bill would be divided between the National Science
Foundation and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. One month before the bill
was enacted, on August 1, 1958, Arthur S. Flemming took over the HEW cabinet position after
Marion Folsom resigned for health reasons. He “took over in time to carry the ball for the
Sputnik-inspired education assistance law” and played the central role in overseeing the
implementation of the act’s provisions.95 The act provided $1 billion over four years to HEW to
provide need-based loans for higher-education students and to provide funding for the purchase
of school laboratory equipment. The NSF received an influx of federal funding which nearly
tripled its budget from a total appropriation of $50 million in fiscal 1958 to $136 million in fiscal
1959. These funds would be used to strengthen and extend the foundation’s fellowship and
institute programs.96 Federal funding and expansion of the NSF’s programs would continue in
the decade following Eisenhower’s retirement; by fiscal 1968, the foundation’s allocated budget
was $500 million.97
Five months prior to his resignation, James R. Killian, Jr. made his last major public
address. On December 30, 1958, he was the keynote speaker at the 125th annual meeting of the
American association for the Advancement of Science in Washington, D.C. He used the speech
as a platform from which to extol the Eisenhower administration’s “record of progress” in the
fields of science funding and education. He hailed the National Defense Education Act as one of
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the “year’s greatest accomplishments,” pointing to the piece of legislation’s role in expanding the
programs of the NSF. He stated correctly that the tripling of the foundation’s budget had helped
to “increase its support of basic research and expand its programs for science-teacher training
and other efforts contributing to the quality of science education.”98 In the years following his
retirement, Killian would claim that the loan program of the NDEA had “changed the whole
psychology about borrowing” and “was a watershed act on the part of Congress. They found a
way to deal with the church-state problem, and for the first time to bring the federal government
into support of education on a large scale. This was its great significance. The urgency of doing
something about strengthening education and science and so on was a great help in
accomplishing that.”99 Killian concluded his December 30th address by cautioning Americans to
remain committed to educational excellence and not to lower their standards of teaching. “A
greater desire to learn and an increased respect for learning—for intellectual excellence—may
now in the long run be essential for national survival.”100 These were powerful and prophetic
words.
On May 28, 1959, Killian sent the president an official letter announcing his intention to
resign the post of Science Advisor. In this personal message, he informed his boss that he was
deeply grateful to have had the opportunity to work under his “inspiring leadership.” He went on
to convey his confidence that “the programs developed during this recent period will stand as a
milestone in the progress of American science.”101 In his memoir, Killian explained that his
decision to resign from the position stemmed from a desire to escape the Washington political
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arena. He reiterated that he had no desire to remain in a government post and had no long-term
political ambitions; he also stated that he “didn’t want [his] public service to become habitforming.”102 Eisenhower responded to Killian’s letter immediately, informing the Science
Advisor that he accepted his resignation. He thanked Killian for his dedication to the position
and pointed out that PSAC’s efforts had “already produced results that should have lasting value
to the nation.”103 The Ukrainian-born Harvard chemist George B. Kistiakowsky would replace
Killian as Science Advisor and chairman of PSAC. Kistiakowsky would later claim that his
relationship with the president was just as amicable as the relationship between Killian and
Eisenhower had been.104
Eisenhower’s claim that PSAC’s work had “already produced results that should have
lasting value to the nation” proved especially true in the realm of education. The National
Defense Education Act of 1958 was the first general education aid measure to be enacted since
the Morrill Land Grant College Act of 1862, the bill which allowed for the creation of stateoperated colleges.105 The act allowed more students to pursue college at both the undergraduate
and graduate levels via federal loans. These loans improved science education by allowing
schoolteachers to pursue further education in the field, thus increasing the quality of teaching. It
also helped stimulate American public school science programs by providing financial aid for the
purchase of classroom materials. Schools could obtain the newer equipment necessary for
implementing new and improved curriculums at cheaper rates through NDEA grants; oftentimes,
schools paid 5% of the costs, the government the other 95%. These grants helped cover the new
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science and mathematics textbooks which schoolchildren in most facilities desperately needed.106
PSAC member Hans Bethe claimed that the Sputnik launch and the NDEA which it spawned had
significantly aided American secondary education, using a personal reminiscence as an example.
“My wife paid a lot of attention to the Ithaca, New York schools. The Ithaca schools improved
tremendously after Sputnik, which was just the time our daughter entered the critical years, I
think, eighth grade or so. And so she got a very good education which she never would have
gotten without Sputnik.”107 The NDEA had marked a major turning point in the history of
American education and was inarguably one of the Eisenhower administration’s greatest
accomplishments. It was also a triumph for Killian and PSAC which reaffirmed the peripheral
but important role of science advice in executive policy making.
Nineteen years after traveling to Washington, D.C., to present the bedridden Dwight D.
Eisenhower with the Atoms for Peace Award, James Rhyne Killian, Jr. passed away at his home
in Cambridge at the age of eighty-three.108 During his tenure as Science Advisor, Killian had
played a small but crucial advisory role in many of the Eisenhower Administration’s policies. He
reminisced, “My role as presidential science advisor in the months of pandemonium following
Sputnik was a heady, iridescent experience for a college president, but it was also one of happy
fulfillment. I was at the center of memorable events.”109 Regarding education reform, Killian was
indeed in the middle of “memorable events.” While president of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in the mid-1950s, he emerged a champion of curricular reform in the mathematics
and sciences. As a subcommittee chairman at the White House Conference on Education, he
continued to push for reform, albeit to little effect. The launch of Sputnik in October of 1957 and
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the climate of anxiety it generated propelled the MIT president to the office of Science Advisor.
From this post, Killian was well-positioned to reassure the nation that the United States had not
fallen behind the Soviet Union while continuing to advocate for increased aid to teachers and
students.
Over time, the president and his “wizard” formed a bond of mutual trust and
understanding forged in the semi-hysterical aftermath of a post-Sputnik world. The confidence
Eisenhower placed in Killian was amplified by the latter’s well-earned reputation for good
judgment and political moderation.110 During the politically-charged negotiations over the
National Defense Education Act, Killian would play a modest but noteworthy role in convincing
the president to not only accept but also wholeheartedly endorse a federal loan title; these federal
loans would benefit numerous students at MIT and other institutions of higher learning. Other
NDEA programs would provide money to secondary education institutions, research facilities,
and the National Science Foundation, all of which would proceed to benefit students and
educators at all levels. In the end, one should remember that James R. Killian, Jr. and PSAC had
no role in implementing public policy under Eisenhower. The advice of Killian and his
committee did, however, prove instrumental in developing many of the administration’s
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Sadly, it appears that amiable relations between the president and his science advisors reached its zenith
during the Eisenhower years. Following Eisenhower’s retirement, the rapport between the White House and its
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domestic policy initiatives, one of the most consequential and longest-lasting of which was
education reform.
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APPENDIX
Original President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 1957
Name
James R. Killian, Jr.
Robert Bacher
William O. Baker
John Bardeen
Lloyd V. Berkner
Hans A. Bethe
Detlev W. Bronk
James Fisk
Donald F. Hornig
George B. Kistiakowsky
Edwin H. Land
Wolfgang Panofsky
Emanuel Piore
Edward Purcell
Isidor Isaac Rabi
H.P. Robertson
Glenn T. Seaborg
Jerome Wiesner
Herbert F. York
Jerrold R. Zacharias
*

Field of Expertise
Engineering/Collegiate
Administration
Physics
Chemistry
Physics
Physics
Physics
Physiology/Biophysics
Physics
Chemistry
Chemistry
Electrical engineering
Physics
Physics
Physics
Physics
Physics
Chemistry
Electrical engineering
Physics
Physics

Biographical information of PSAC located in: Wang, In Sputnik’s Shadow.

*

Institution
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT)
California Tech
Bell Labs
University of Illinois
Associated Universities Inc.
Cornell University
Rockefeller Institute
Bell Labs
Princeton University
Harvard University
Polaroid Corporation
Stanford University
IBM
Harvard University
Columbia University
California Tech
University of California, Berkeley
MIT
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
MIT

